Convex empirical risk minimization is a basic tool in machine learning and statistics. We provide new algorithms and matching lower bounds for differentially private convex empirical risk minimization assuming only that each data point's contribution to the loss function is Lipschitz and that the domain of optimization is bounded. We provide a separate set of algorithms and matching lower bounds for the setting in which the loss functions are known to also be strongly convex.
I. INTRODUCTION
Convex optimization is one of the most basic and powerful computational tools in statistics and machine learning. It is most commonly used for empirical risk minimization (ERM): the data set D = {d 1 , ..., d n } defines a convex loss function L(·) which is minimized over a convex set C. When run on sensitive data, however, the results of convex ERM can leak sensitive information. For example, medians and support vector machine parameters can, in many cases, leak entire records in the clear (see "Motivation", below).
In this paper, we provide new algorithms and matching lower bounds for differentially private convex ERM assuming only that each data point's contribution to the loss function is Lipschitz and that the domain of optimization is bounded. This builds on a line of work started by Chaudhuri et al. [11] .
Problem formulation. Given a data set D = {d 1 , ..., d n } drawn from a universe X , and a closed, convex set C, our goal is to
The map defines, for each data point d, a loss function (·; d) on C. We will generally assume that (·; d) is convex and L-Lipschitz for all d ∈ X . One obtains variants on this basic problem by assuming additional restrictions, such as (i) that (·; d) is Δ-strongly convex for all d ∈ X, and/or (ii) that (·; d) is β-smooth for all d ∈ X. Definitions of Lipschitz, strong convexity and smoothness are provided at the end of the introduction. For example, given a collection of data points in R p , the Euclidean 1-median is a point in R p that minimizes the sum of the Euclidean distances to the data points. That is, (θ; d i ) = θ − d i 2 , which is 1-Lipschitz in θ for any choice of d i . Another common example is the support vector machine (SVM): given a data point d i = (x i , y i ) ∈ R p × {−1, 1}, one defines a loss function (θ; d i ) = hinge(y i · θ, x i ), where hinge(z) = (1 − z) + (here (1 − z) + equals 1 − z for z ≤ 1 and 0, otherwise). The loss is L-Lipshitz in θ when x i 2 ≤ L. Our formulation also captures regularized ERM, in which an additional (convex) function r(θ) is added to the loss function to penalize certain types of solutions; the loss function is then r(θ) + n i=1 (θ; d i ). One can fold the regularizer r(·) into the data-dependent functions by replacing (θ; d i ) with (θ; d i ) = (θ; d i ) + 1 n r(θ), so that L(θ; D) = i˜ (θ; d i ). This folding comes at some loss of generality (since it may increase the Lipschitz constant), but it does not affect asymptotic results. Note that if r is Δn-strongly convex, then everỹ is Δ-strongly convex. We measure the success of our algorithms by the worst-case (over inputs) expected excess empirical risk, namely E(L(θ; D) − L(θ * ; D)), (1) whereθ is the output of the algorithm, θ * = arg min θ∈C L(θ; D) is the true minimizer, and the expectation is only over the coins of the algorithm. Expected risk guarantees can be converted to high-probability guarantees using standard techniques (see full version [3] ).
Another important measure of performance is an algorithm's (excess) generalization error, where loss is measured with respect to the average over an unknown distribution from which the data are assumed to be drawn i.i.d.. Our upper bounds on empirical risk imply upper bounds on generalization error (via uniform convergence and similar ideas); the resulting bounds are only known to be tight in certain ranges of parameters, however. Detailed statements may be found in full version [3] . This proceedings version discusses only empirical error. Motivation. Convex ERM is used for fitting models from simple least-squares regression to support vector machines, and their use may have significant implications to privacy. As a simple example, note that the Euclidean 1-median of a data set will typically be an actual data point, since the gradient of the loss function has discontinuities at each of the d i . (Thinking about the one-dimensional median, where there is always a data point that minimizes the loss, is helpful.) Thus, releasing the median may well reveal one of the data points in the clear. A more subtle example is the support vector machine (SVM). The solution to an SVM program is often presented in its dual form, whose coefficients typically consist of a set of p+1 exact data points. [26] show how the results of many convex ERM problems can be combined to carry out reconstruction attacks in the spirit of [13] . Differential privacy is a rigorous notion of privacy that emerged from a line of work in theoretical computer science and cryptography [18, 7, 17] . We say two data sets D and D of size n are neighbors if they differ in one entry (that is, |D D | = 2). A randomized algorithm A is ( , δ)differentially private ( [17, 16] ) if, for all neighboring data sets D and D and for all events S in the output space of A, we have
Algorithms that satisfy differential privacy for < 1 and δ 1/n provide meaningful privacy guarantees, even in the presence of side information. In particular, they avoid the problems mentioned in "Motivation" above. See [15, 27, 28] for discussion of the "semantics" of differential privacy. Setting Parameters. We will aim to quantify the role of several basic parameters on the excess risk of differentially private algorithms: the size of the data set n, the dimension p of the parameter space C, the Lipschitz constant L of the loss functions, the diameter C 2 of the constraint set and, when applicable, the strong convexity Δ.
We may take L and C 2 to be 1 without loss of generality: We can set C 2 = 1 by rescaling θ (replacing by θ with θ · C 2 ); we can then set L = 1 by rescaling the loss function L (replacing L by L/L). These two transformations change the excess risk by L C 2 . The parameter Δ cannot similarly be rescaled while keeping L and C 2 the same. However, we always have Δ ≤ 2L/ C 2 .
In the sequel, we thus focus on the setting where L = C 2 = 1 and Δ ∈ [0, 2]. To convert excess risk bounds for L = C 2 = 1 to the general setting, one can multiply the risk bounds by L C 2 , and replace Δ by Δ C 2 L .
A. Contributions
We give algorithms that significantly improve on the state of the art for optimizing non-smooth loss functions -for both the general case and strongly convex functions, we improve the excess risk bounds by a factor of √ n, asymptotically. The algorithms we give for ( , 0)and ( , δ)-differential privacy work on very different principles. We group the algorithms below by technique: gradient descent, exponential sampling, and localization. For the purposes of this section,Õ(·) notation hides factors polynomial in log n and log(1/δ). Detailed bounds are stated in Table I .
Gradient descent-based algorithms. For ( , δ)-differential privacy, we show that a noisy version of gradient descent achieves excess riskÕ( √ p/ ). This matches our lower bound, Ω(min(n, √ p/ )), up to logarithmic factors. (Note that every θ ∈ C has excess risk at most n, so a lower bound of n can always be matched.) For Δ-strongly convex functions, a variant of our algorithm has riskÕ( p Δn 2 ), which matches the lower bound Ω( p n 2 ) when Δ is bounded below by a constant (recall that Δ ≤ 2 since L = C 2 = 1).
Previously, the best known risk bounds were Ω( √ pn/ ) for general convex functions and Ω( p √ nΔ 2 ) for Δ-strongly convex functions (achievable via several different techniques ( [11, 29, 21, 14] )). Under the restriction that each data point's contribution to the loss function is sufficiently smooth, objective perturbation [11, 29] also has riskÕ( √ p/ ) (which is tight, since the lower bounds apply to smooth functions). However, smooth functions do not include important special cases such as medians and support vector machines. [11] suggest applying their technique to support vector machines by smoothing ("huberizing") the loss function. We show in the full version [3] that this approach still yields expected excess risk Ω( √ pn/ ).
Although straightforward noisy gradient descent would work well in our setting, we present a faster variant based on stochastic gradient descent: At each step t, the algorithm samples a random point d i from the data set, computes a noisy version of d i 's contribution to the gradient of L at the current estimateθ t , and then uses that noisy measurement to update the parameter estimate. The algorithm is similar to algorithms that have appeared previously ( [41] first investigated gradient descent with noisy updates; stochastic variants were studied by [21, 14, 39] ). The novelty of our analysis lies in taking advantage of the randomness in the choice of d i (following [25] ) to run the algorithm for many steps without a significant cost to privacy. Running the algorithm for T = n 2 steps, gives the desired expected excess risk bound. Even nonprivate first-order algorithms-i.e., those based on gradient measurements-must learn information about the gradient at Ω(n 2 ) points to get risk bounds that are independent of n (this follows from "oracle complexity" bounds showing that 1/ √ T convergence rate is optimal [32, 1] ).
The gradient descent approach does not, to our knowledge, allow one to get optimal excess risk bounds for ( , 0)differential privacy. The main obstacle is that "strong composition" of ( , δ)-privacy [19] appears necessary to allow a first-order method to run for sufficiently many steps.
Exponential Sampling-based Algorithms. For ( , 0)differential privacy, we observe that a straightforward ( , 0)-DP ( , δ)-DP Previous [11] This work Previous [29] ..)) AND LOWER BOUNDS, AS Ω(min(n, ...))).
. WE ASSUME δ < 1/n TO SIMPLIFY THE BOUNDS. use of the exponential mechanism -sampling from an appropriately-sized net of points in C, where each point θ has probability proportional to exp(− L(θ; D)) -has excess risk O(p/ ) on general Lipschitz functions, nearly matching the lower bound of Ω(p/ ). (The bound would not be optimal for ( , δ)-privacy because it scales as p, not √ p). This mechanism is inefficient in general since it requires construction of a net and an appropriate sampling mechanism.
We give a polynomial time algorithm that achieves the optimal excess risk, namely O(p/ ). Note that the achieved excess risk does not have any logarithmic factors which is shown to be the case using a "peeling-"type argument that is specific to convex functions. The idea of our algorithm is to sample efficiently from the continuous distribution on all points in C with density P(θ) ∝ e − L(θ) . Although the distribution we hope to sample from is log-concave, standard techniques do not work for our purposes: existing methods converge only in statistical difference, whereas we require a multiplicative convergence guarantee to provide ( , 0)-differential privacy. Previous solutions to this issue ( [20] ) worked for the uniform distribution, but not for log-concave distributions.
The problem comes from the combination of an arbitrary convex set and an arbitrary (Lipschitz) loss function defining P. We circumvent this issue by giving an algorithm that samples from an appropriately defined distributionP on a cube containing C, such thatP (i) outputs a point in C with constant probability, and (ii) conditioned on sampling from C, is within multiplicative distance O( ) from the correct distribution. We use, as a subroutine, the random walk on grid points of the cube of [2] .
Localization: Optimal Algorithms for Strongly Convex
Functions. The exponential-sampling-based technique discussed above does not take advantage of strong convexity of the loss function. We show, however, that a novel combination of two standard techniques-the exponential mechanism and Laplace-noise-based output perturbation-does yield an optimal algorithm. [11] and [34] showed that strongly convex functions have low-sensitivity minimizers, and hence that one can release the minimum of a strongly convex function with Laplace noise (with total Euclidean length about ρ = p Δ n if each loss function is Δ-strongly convex). Simply using this first estimate as a candidate output does not yield optimal utility in general; instead it gives a risk bound of roughly p Δ . The main insight is that this first estimate defines us a small neighborhood C 0 ⊆ C, of radius about ρ, that contains the true minimizer. Running the exponential mechanism in this small set improves the excess risk bound by a factor of about ρ over running the same mechanism on all of C. The final risk bound is thenÕ(ρ p n ) =Õ( p 2 Δ 2 n ), which matches the lower bound of Ω( p 2 2 n ) when Δ = Ω(1). This simple "localization" idea is not needed for ( , δ)-privacy, since the gradient descent method can already take advantage of strong convexity to converge more quickly.
Lower bounds. We use techniques developed to bound the accuracy of releasing 1-way marginals (due to [20] for ( , 0)− and [9] for ( , δ)-privacy) to show that our algorithms have essentially optimal risk bounds. The instances that arise in our lower bounds are simple: the functions can be linear (or quadratic, for the case of strong convexity) and the constraint set C can be either the unit ball or the hypercube. In particular, our lower bounds apply to special case of smooth functions, demonstrating the optimality of objective perturbation [11, 29] in that setting. The reduction to lower-bounds for 1-way marginals is not quite black-box; we exploit specific properties of the instances used by [20, 9] .
Finally, we provide a much stronger lower bound on the utility of a specific algorithm, the Huberization-based algorithm proposed by [11] for support vector machines. In order to apply their algorithm to nonsmooth loss functions, they proposed smoothing the loss function by Huberization, and then running their algorithm (which requires smoothness for the privacy analysis) on the resulting, modified loss functions.
We show that for any setting of the Huerization parameters, there are simple, one-dimensional nonsmooth loss functions for which the algorithm has error Ω(n). This bound justifies the effort we put into designing new algorithms for nonsmooth loss functions.
B. Other Related Work
In addition to the previous work mentioned above, we mention several closely related works. A rich line of work seeks to characterize the optimal error of differentially private algorithms for learning and optimization [25, 4, 10, 5, 6] . In particular, our results on ( , 0)-differential privacy imply nearly-tight bounds on the "representation dimension" [6] of convex Lipschitz functions.
[23] gave dimension-independent expected excess risk bounds for the special case of "generalized linear models" with a strongly convex regularizer, assuming that C = R p (that is, unconstrained optimization). [29, 37] considered parameter convergence for high-dimensional sparse regression (where p n). Efficient implementations of the exponential mechanism over infinite domains were discussed by [20] , [12] and [24] . The latter two works were specific to sampling (approximately) singular vectors of a matrix, and their techniques do not obviously apply here.
Differentially private convex learning in different models has also been studied: for example, [21, 14, 38] study online optimization, [22] study an interactive model tailored to highdimensional kernel learning.
C. Additional Definitions
For completeness, we state a few additional definitions related to convex sets and functions.
• is Δ-strongly convex on C if, for all x ∈ C, for all subgradients z at x, and for all y ∈ C, we have (y) ≥ (x) + z, y − x + Δ 2 y − x 2 2 (i.e., is bounded below by a quadratic function tangent at x).
• is β-smooth on C if, for all x ∈ C, for all subgradients z at x and for all y ∈ C, we have (y) ≤ (x) + z, y − x + β 2 y − x 2 2 (i.e., is bounded above by a quadratic function tangent at x). Smoothness implies differentiability, so the subgradient at x is unique. • Given a convex set C, we denote its diameter by C 2 .
We denote the projection of any vector θ ∈ R p to the convex set C by Π C (θ) = arg min x∈C θ − x 2 .
II. GRADIENT DESCENT AND OPTIMAL ( , δ)-DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE OPTIMIZATION
In this section we provide an algorithm A Noise−GD (Algorithm 1) for computing θ priv using a noisy stochastic variant of the classic gradient descent algorithm from the optimization literature [8] . Our algorithm (and the utility analysis) was inspired by the approach of [41] for logistic regression.
All the excess risk bounds (1) in this section and the rest of this paper, are presented in expectation over the randomness of the algorithm. In the full version [3] we provide a generic tool to translate the expectation bounds into high probability bound albeit at a loss of extra logarithmic factor in the inverse of the failure probability. Note (1) : The results in this section do not require the loss function to be differentiable. Although we present Algorithm A Noise−GD (and its analysis) using the gradient of the loss function (θ; d) at θ, the same guarantees hold if instead of the gradient, the algorithm is run with any sub-gradient of at θ. Note (2) : Instead of using the stochastic variant in Algorithm 1, one can use the complete gradient (i.e., L(θ; D)) in Step 5 and still have the same utility guarantee as Theorem II.4. However, the running time goes up by a factor of n. Pick d ∼ u D with replacement. 5 :
where b t ∼ N 0, I p σ 2 . 6: Output θ priv = θ n 2 .
Theorem II.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm A Noise−GD (Algorithm 1) is ( , δ)-differentially private.
Proof: At any time step t ∈ [n 2 ] in Algorithm A Noise−GD , fix the randomness due to sampling in Line 4. Let X t (D) = n ( θ t ; d) + b t be a random variable defined over the randomness of b t and conditioned on θ t (see Line 5 for a definition), where d ∈ D is the data point picked in Line 4. Denote μ Xt(D) (y) to be the measure of the random variable X t (D) induced on y ∈ R. For any two neighboring data sets D and D , define the privacy loss random variable [19] to be W t = log (Xt(D) ) . Standard differential privacy arguments for Gaussian noise addition (see [29, 33] ) will ensure that with probability 1 − δ 2 (over the randomness of the random variables b t 's and conditioned on the randomness due to sampling), W t ≤ Lemma II.2 (Privacy amplification via sampling. Lemma 4 in [4] ). Over a domain of data sets T n , if an algorithm A is ≤ 1 differentially private, then for any data set D ∈ T n , executing A on uniformly random γn entries of D ensures 2γ -differential privacy.
To conclude the proof, we apply "strong composition" (Lemma II.3) from [19] . With probability at least 1 − δ, the privacy loss W = n 2 t=1 W t is at most . This concludes the proof.
Lemma II.3 (Strong composition [19] ). Let , δ ≥ 0. The class of -differentially private algorithms satisfies ( , δ )differential privacy under T -fold adaptive composition for = 2T ln(1/δ ) + T (e − 1).
In Theorem II.4 we provide the utility guarantees for Algorithm A Noise−GD under two different settings, namely, when the function is Lipschitz, and when the function is Lipschitz and strongly convex. (For a proof, seefull version [3] .) In Section V we argue that these excess risk bounds are essentially tight.
Note: In the full version [3] , we show that one can plug in the empirical risk bounds into standard results from learning theory [35] , to obtain excess generalization error (excess risk) bounds. The main crux of our results is that we obtain the same dependence on the number of samples (n), when compared to the non-private bounds. However, the private bounds have an explicit dependence on the dimensionality (p).
Theorem
II.4 (Utility guarantee). Let σ 2 = O L 2 n 2 log(n/δ) log(1/δ) , then we have the following excess risk bound. Here L is the Lipscthiz constant of the loss function .
2) Lipschitz and strongly convex functions: If we set the learning rate function η t (t) = 1 Δnt , then we have the following excess risk bound. Here L is the Lipscthiz constant of the loss function and Δ is the strong convexity parameter.
Proof: Let G t = n ( θ t ; d) + b t in Line 5 of Algorithm 1. First notice that over the randomness of the sampling of the data entry d from D, and the randomness of
In the above expression we have used the fact that since
We can now directly use Lemma II.5 to obtain the required error guarantee for Lipschitz convex functions, and Lemma II.6 for Lipschitz and strongly convex functions.
Lemma II.5 (Theorem 2 from [36] ). Let F (θ) (for θ ∈ C) be a convex function and let θ * = arg min θ∈C F (θ). Let θ 1 be any arbitrary point from C. Consider the stochastic gradi-
Then for any T > 1, the following is true.
Using the bound from (2) in Lemma II.5 (i.e., set G = n 2 L 2 + pσ 2 ), and setting T = n 2 and the learning rate function η t (t) as in Lemma II.5, gives us the required excess risk bound for Lipschitz convex functions. For Lipschitz and strongly convex functions we use the following result by [36] .
Lemma II.6 (Theorem 1 from [36] ). Let F (θ) (for θ ∈ C) be a λ-strongly convex function and let θ * = arg min θ∈C F (θ). Let θ 1 be any arbitrary point from C. Consider the stochastic gradient descent algorithm
] ≤ G 2 and the learning rate function η(t) = 1 λt . Then for any T > 1, the following is true.
Using the bound from (2) in Lemma II.6 (i.e., set G = n 2 L 2 + pσ 2 ), λ = nΔ, and setting T = n 2 and the learning rate function η t (t) as in Lemma II.6, gives us the required excess risk bound for Lipschitz and strongly convex convex functions. Note: Algorithm A Noise−GD has a running time of O(pn 2 ), assuming that the gradient computation for takes time O(p).
III. EXPONENTIAL SAMPLING AND OPTIMAL
( , 0)-PRIVATE OPTIMIZATION In this section, we focus on the case of pure -differential privacy and provide an optimal efficient algorithm for empirical risk minimization for the general class of convex and Lipschitz loss functions. The main building block of this section is the well-known exponential mechanism [31] .
First, we show that a variant of the exponential mechanism is optimal. A major technical contribution of this section is θ * Convex set: C
Differential cone: Ω Fig. 1 . Differential cone Ω inside the convex set C to make the exponential mechanism computationally efficient which is discussed in Section III-B.
A. Exponential Mechanism for Lipschitz Convex Loss
In this section, we only deal with loss functions which are Lipschitz. We provide an -differentially private algorithm (Algorithm 2) which achieves the optimal excess risk for arbitrary convex bounded sets. Theorem III.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm 2 isdifferentially private.
Proof: Note that the distribution in step 2 will remain the same if we used exp − L C 2 (L(θ; D) − L(θ 0 ; D)) for some arbitrary point θ 0 ∈ C. The proof then follows from the fact that the sensitivity of L(θ; D)−L(θ 0 ; D) is at most L C 2 and the analysis of the exponential mechanism by [31] .
Theorem III.2 (Utility guarantee). Let θ priv be the output of A exp−samp (Algorithm 2 above). Then, we have the following guarantee on the expected excess risk. (The expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm.)
Proof: Consider a differential cone Ω centered at θ * (see Figure 1 ). We will bound the expected excess risk of θ priv by O pL C 2 conditioned on θ priv ∈ Ω∩C for every differential cone. This immediately implies the above theorem by the properties of conditional expectation.
Let Γ be a fixed threshold (to be set later) and let R(θ) = L(θ priv ; D) − L(θ * ; D) for the purposes of brevity. Let the marked sets A i 's in Figure 1 be defined as
Instead of directly computing the probability of θ priv being outside A 1 , we will analyze the probabilities for being in each of the A i 's individually. This form of "peeling" arguments have been used for risk analysis of convex loss in the machine learning literature (e.g., see [40] ) and will allow us to get rid of the extra logarithmic factor that would have otherwise shown up in the excess risk if we use the standard analysis of the exponential mechanism in [31] .
Since the Ω is a differential cone and since R(θ) is continuous on C, it follows that within Ω ∩ C, R(θ) only depends on θ − θ * 2 . Therefore, let r 1 , r 2 , · · · be the distance of the set boundaries of A 1 , A 2 , · · · from θ * . (See Figure 1. ) One can equivalently write each A i as follows:
The following claim (which is proved in the full version [3] ) is the key part of the proof.
Now, the volume of the set A i is given by Vol(A i ) = κ ri ri−1 r p−1 dr for some fixed constant κ. Hence,
where the last two inequalities follows from Claim III.3. Let
Ai]
Pr[θ priv ∈A2] . Hence, γ can be bounded as
where we use the fact that (i − 1) p ≤ 3 p · 2 i−4 p for i ≥ 4 in the last inequality which holds when Γ is sufficiently large. Hence, for every t > 0, if we choose Γ = 2L C 2 ((p + 1) ln 3 + t), we get γ ≤ e −t . Thus, conditioned on θ priv ∈ C ∩ Ω, we have Pr[R(θ priv ) ≥ 8L C 2 ((p + 1) ln 3 + t)] ≤ e −t . Since this is true for every t > 0, we have our required bound as a corollary.
B. Efficient Implementation of Algorithm 2
In this section, we give a high-level description of a computationally efficient construction of Algorithm 2. Our algorithm runs in polynomial time in n, p and outputs a sample θ ∈ C from a distribution that is arbitrarily close (in the multiplicative sense) to the distribution of the output of Algorithm 2.
Since we are interested in an efficient pure -differentially private algorithm, we need an efficient sampler with a multiplicative distance guarantee. In fact, if we were interested in ( , δ) algorithms, efficient sampling with a total variation guarantee would have sufficed which would have made our task a lot easier as we could have used one of the exisiting algorithms, e.g., [30] . In [20] , it was shown how to sample efficiently with a multiplicative guarantee from the unifrom distribution over a convex bounded set. However, what we want to achieve here is more general, that is, to sample efficiently from any given logconcave distribution defined over a convex bounded set. To the best of our knowledge, this task has not been explicitly worked out before, nevertheless, all the ingredients needed to accomplish it are present in the literature, mainly [2] .
We highlight here the main ideas of our constrution, however, due to space constraints and since such construction is not specific to our privacy problem, we provide the details of such construction and the proof of our main result in this section (Theorem III.4 below) in the full version [3] .
Theorem III.4. There is an efficient version of Algorithm 2 that has the following guarantees.
1) Privacy:
The algorithm is -differentially private. 2) Utility: The output θ priv ∈ C of the algorithm satisfies
3) Running time: Assuming C is in isotropic position, the algorithm runs in time 1
In fact, the running time of our algorithm depends on C ∞ rather than C 2 . Namely, all the C 2 terms in the running time can be replaced with C ∞ , however, we chose to write it in this less conservative way since all the bounds in this paper are expressed in terms of C 2 .
Before describing our construction, we first introduce some useful notation and discuss some preliminaries.
For any two probability measures μ, ν defined with respect to the same sample space Q ⊆ R p , the relative (multiplicative) distance between μ and ν, denoted as Dist ∞ (μ, ν) is defined as
where dμ(q) dν(q) (resp., dν(q) dμ(q) ) denotes the ratio of the two measures (more precisely, the Radon-Nikodym derivative). Assumptions: We assume that we can efficiently test whether a given point θ ∈ R p lies in C using a membership oracle. We also assume that we can efficienly optimize an efficiently computable convex function over a convex set. To do this, it suffices to have a projection oracle. We do not take into account the extra polynomial factor in the running time which is required to perform such operations since this factor is highly dependent on the specific structure of the set C. 1 If C is not in isotropic position, the running time will pick up an extra factor of O(max p 2 , polylog 1 r where r is the diameter of the largest ball we can fit inside C. See the full version [3] for details.
C. Our construction
Let τ denote the L ∞ diameter of C. The Minkowski's norm of θ ∈ R p with respect to C, denoted as ψ(θ), is defined as ψ(θ) = inf{r > 0 : θ ∈ rC}. We defineψ α (θ) α · max{0, ψ(θ) − 1} for α > 0. Note that ψ α (θ) > 0 if and only if θ / ∈ C. Moreover, it is not hard to verify thatψ α is α-Lipschitz.
We use the grid-walk algorithm of [2] for sampling from a logconcave distribution defined over a cube as a building block. Our construction is described as follows:
1) Enclose the set C with a cube A with edges of length τ .
2) Obtain a convex Lipschitz extensionL(.; D) of the loss function L(.; D) over A. This can be done efficiently using a projection oracle. [3] for details). 4) Run the grid-walk algorithm of [2] with F as the input weight function and A as the input cube, and output a sample θ whose distribution is close, with respect to Dist ∞ , to the distribution induced by F on A which is given by
Let's denote the aove efficient procedure by A cube−samp . We then argue that due to the choices made for the values of the parameters above, A cube−samp outputs a sample in C with probability at least 1 2 . That is, the algorithm succeeds to output a sample from a distribution close to the right distribution on C with probability at least 1/2. Hence, we can amplify the probability of success by repeating A cube−samp sufficiently many times where fresh random coins are used by A cube−samp in every time (specifically, O(n) iterations would suffice). If A cube−samp returns a sample θ ∈ C in one of those iterations, then our algorithm terminates outputting θ. Otherwise, it outputs a uniformly random sample θ ⊥ from the unit ball B (Note that B ⊆ C since C is assumed to be in isotropic position). We finally show that this termination condition can only change the distribution of the output sample by a constant factor sufficiently close to 1. Hence, we obtain our efficient algorithm referred to in Theorem III.4.
IV. LOCALIZATION AND OPTIMAL PRIVATE ALGORITHMS
FOR STRONGLY CONVEX LOSS It is unclear how to get a direct variant of Algorithm 2 in Section III for Lipschitz and strongly convex losses that can achieve optimal excess risk guarantees. The issue in extending Algorithm 2 directly is that the convex set C over which the exponential mechanism is defined is "too large" to provide tight guarantees.
We show a generic -differentially private algorithm for minimizing Lipschitz strongly convex loss functions based on a combination of a simple pre-processing step (called the localization step) and any generic -differentially private algorithm for Lipschitz convex loss functions. We carry out the localization step using a simple output perturbation algorithm which ensures that the convex set over which the -differentially private algorithm (in the second step) is run has diameterÕ(p/n).
Next, we instantiate the generic -differentially private algorithm in the second step with our efficient exponential sampling (Algorithm 2) to obtain an algorithm with optimal excess risk bound (Theorem IV.3). Details of the generic algorithm: We first give a simple algorithm (Algorithm 3 below) that carries out the desired localization step. The crux of the algorithm is the same as to that of the output perturbation algorithm of [11] .
Algorithm 3 A out−pert : Output Perturbation for Strongly Convex Loss
Input: data set of size n: D, loss function , strong convexity parameter Δ, privacy parameter , convex set C, and radius parameter ζ < 1.
where α is a normalizing constant) and Π C is the projection on to the convex set C. 4: 
Having Algorithm 3 in hand, we now give a genericdifferentially private algorithm for minimizing L over C. Let A gen−Lip denote any generic -differentially private algorithm for optimizing L over some arbitrary convex setC ⊆ C. Algorithm 2 from Section III-A (or its efficient version from Section III-B) is an example of A gen−Lip . The algorithm we present here (Algorithm 4 below) makes a black-box call in its first step to A 2 out−pert (Algorithm 3 shown above), then, in the second step, it feeds the output of A 2 out−pert into A 2 gen−Lip and ouptut.
Algorithm 4 Output-perturbation-based Generic Algorithm Input: data set of size n: D, loss function , strong convexity parameter Δ, privacy parameter , and convex set C. 1: Run A 2 out−pert (Algorithm 3) with input privacy parameter /2, radius parameter ζ = 3 log (n), and output C 0 . 2: Run A 2 gen−Lip on inputs n, D, , privacy parameter /2, and convex set C 0 , and output θ priv .
Theorem IV.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm 4 isdifferentially private.
Proof: The privacy guarantee follows directly from the composition theorem together with the fact that A 2 out−pert is 2 -differentially private (see [11] ) and that A 2 gen−Lip is 2differentially private by assumption.
In the following lemma (see the full version [3] for a proof), we provide a generic expression for the excess risk of Algorithm 4 in terms of the expected excess risk of any given algorithm A gen−Lip . Instantiation of A 2 gen−Lip with Algorithm 2: Next, we give our optimal -differentially private algorithm for Lipschitz strongly convex loss functions. To do this, we instantiate the generic Algorithm A gen−Lip in Algorithm 4 with our exponential sampling algorithm from Section III-A (Algorithm 2), or its efficient version (Section III-B) to obtain the optimal excess risk bound. We formally state the bound in Theorem IV.3) below whose proof follows from Theorem III.2 and Lemma IV.2 above. where θ * = arg min θ∈C L(θ; D).
V. LOWER BOUNDS ON EXCESS RISK
In this section, we complete the picture by deriving lower bounds on the excess risk caused by differentially private algorithm for risk minimization. In Section V-A, we consider the case of convex Lipschitz loss functions, whereas in Section V-B, we consider the case of strongly convex and Lipschitz loss functions.
Before we state and prove our lower bounds, we first give the following useful lemma which gives lower bounds on the L 2 -error incurred by and ( , δ)-differentially private algorithms for estimating the 1-way marginals of datasets over {− 1 √ p , 1 √ p } p . This lemma is based on the results of [20] and [9] . We give a detailed proof of this lemma in the full version of our paper [3] .
Lemma V.1 (Lower bounds for 1-way marginals). 1) -differential private algorithms: Let n, p ∈ N and > 0. There is a number M = Ω (min (n, p/ )) such that for every -differentially private algorithm A, there is a dataset D = {d 1 , . . . ,
M +1] such that, with probability at least 1/2 (taken over the algorithm random coins), we have A(D) − q(D) 2 = Ω min 1, p n Note: In the full version [3] , we provide a simple reduction to transform our lower bounds above to the case of arbitrary L, C 2 , and Δ.
